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Abstract
Understanding the evolution of intelligence rests on comparative analyses of brain sizes as well as the assessment of
cognitive skills of different species in relation to potential selective pressures such as environmental conditions and social
organization. Because of the strong interest in human cognition, much previous work has focused on the comparison of the
cognitive skills of human toddlers to those of our closest living relatives, i.e. apes. Such analyses revealed that apes and
children have relatively similar competencies in the physical domain, while human children excel in the socio-cognitive
domain; in particular in terms of attention sharing, cooperation, and mental state attribution. To develop a full
understanding of the evolutionary dynamics of primate intelligence, however, comparative data for monkeys are needed.
We tested 18 Old World monkeys (long-tailed macaques and olive baboons) in the so-called Primate Cognition Test Battery
(PCTB) (Herrmann et al. 2007, Science). Surprisingly, our tests revealed largely comparable results between Old World
monkeys and the Great apes. Single comparisons showed that chimpanzees performed only better than the macaques in
experiments on spatial understanding and tool use, but in none of the socio-cognitive tasks. These results question the
clear-cut relationship between cognitive performance and brain size and – prima facie – support the view of an accelerated
evolution of social intelligence in humans. One limitation, however, is that the initial experiments were devised to tap into
human specific skills in the first place, thus potentially underestimating both true nonhuman primate competencies as well
as species differences.
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Introduction
Understanding the evolution of human cognition and commu-
nication rests primarily on comparative analyses with other extant
members of the primate order. There are two major and
interrelated streams of research; one focuses on the evolution of
the brain, while the other aims at elucidating similarities and
differences in behaviour. Such analyses thus incorporate informa-
tion about the phylogenetic relationships between species as well as
the putative selective pressures that might have played a role in
shaping a species’ cognitive skills. Within the hominoidea (apes
and humans), the last common ancestor of humans and their
closest relatives, the chimpanzees and bonobos, is dated at about
6 mya [1], while the split between the Hominoidea and the
Cercopithecoidea (Old World monkeys) occurred between 29 and
24 mya [2]. Taking this phylogenetic information into account is a
prerequisite for identifying the dynamics in the evolution of
specific adaptations. One striking feature within the primate order
is a disproportionate increase in relative brain size from monkeys
to apes to humans [3]. In particular, the neocortex has
experienced considerable expansion. The neocortex is important
for sensory perception, generation of motor commands, and
higher cognition [4]. In the 1980s, the most prominent hypothesis
was that the increase in brain size in primates was related to
frugivory, that is, the need to find food that is patchily distributed
in space and time [5]. In recent years, the focus has returned to the
idea that primate intelligence evolved in response to the challenges
of living in large and complex groups – the so-called ‘‘Social
Brain’’ hypothesis [6–12].
Whether this increase in brain size at the same time predicts an
increase in cognitive abilities remains controversial. For instance, it
has been proposed that overall brain size best predicts the
cognitive abilities across nonhuman primates [13,14]. More
recently, a number of scholars have aimed to derive more specific
links between particular brain areas and cognitive performance.
Shultz and Dunbar [15], for example, claimed that the neocortex
ratio and hippocampus volume are particularly important for
problem solving and executive control. Others, however, have
pointed out that attempts to link brain size to function is fraught
with problems, including the choice of the variables entered in the
analyses, and the problems associated with multiple correlations
[16]. Further, size per se might not be the critical factor, but in fact
the modularity and interconnectedness of different brain areas
[17].
Yet, it is undisputed that human brains are disproportionately
larger than the brains of other primate species. In line with this, a
systematic comparison of the cognitive skills of human toddlers
and great apes revealed substantial differences in cognitive
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experiments (the so-called Primate Cognition Test Battery
[PCTB]). While great apes and children showed relatively similar
competencies in the physical domain (space, quantities, causality),
human children excelled in the socio-cognitive tasks; in particular
in terms of attention sharing, cooperation, and mental state
attribution. This supports the assumption that social aspects were
the driving force in the evolution of intelligence, at least in the
transition from apes to humans.
To develop a full understanding of the evolutionary dynamics of
primate intelligence, however, comparative data for monkeys are
needed [19]. With the increase in brain size from monkeys to apes
one would predict that apes would outperform monkeys in
cognitive tasks. Indeed, Byrne and Whiten [6] noted for example
that tactical deception seems to be more common in great apes
than in monkeys. Furthermore, only great apes recognize
themselves in mirrors [20,21], lending further support for the
distinction between monkeys and apes. A meta-analysis of
published nonhuman primate cognition studies also indicated that
‘‘great apes significantly outperformed other lineages’’ (p. 115) in
their overall performance [22].
In contrast to these results, a recent study by Amici and
colleagues [23] suggested that the cognitive abilities of monkeys
and apes are not so different. They compared the performance of
three monkey species (spider monkeys, capuchin monkeys, long-
tailed macaques) and all four great ape species in spatial
displacement and support tasks (i.e. using for example an
unbroken cloth to pull in a reward) and found no support for a
clear-cut difference between apes and monkeys. Notably, an
additional analysis focusing on inhibition tasks revealed that
species living in systems with fission-fusion dynamics (chimpan-
zees, bonobos, orangutans, and spider monkeys) outperformed
members of species that live in more stable groups (long-tailed
macaques, gorillas and capuchin monkeys). Apparently, the level
of social complexity predicted the inhibitory skills better than
phylogenetic relatedness or ecological conditions [24]. One
possible explanation for the discrepant assessments of the
differences between monkeys and apes may be that the (meta-)
analyses incorporated results of experiments or observations made
in different studies using different methods. Furthermore, the
differences between monkeys and apes may have been overesti-
mated, because in many studies highly trained apes were
compared to naive monkeys [25]. Thus, although more compar-
ative studies are now available [26], systematic interspecific
comparisons are still rare.
The differences in results may also be due to the fact that different
tests may tap into different cognitive domains. In other words, there
may be no increaseingeneral intelligence from monkeysto apes,but
moredomainspecificdifferences.Interestingly,Amiciandcolleagues
[23] found no clear distinction between monkeys and apes in their
spatial memory, transposition, and support tasks, but what remains
unknown is whether there are differences between the two lineages
regarding other cognitive aspects. For instance, in the experiments
by Herrmann et al. [18] great apes and children did not differ in
theirphysico-cognitivecapacities,butonlyintheexperimentsrelying
onsocialcognition.Perhapsthisisalsothe caseinthe transition from
monkeys to apes. Thus, we set out to systematically compare the
skills of monkeys to that of apes, applying the same test as Hermann
and colleagues on apes and toddlers. We therefore conducted the
complete suite of experiments of the Primate Cognition Test Battery
with Old World monkeys (olive baboons and long-tailed macaques)
housed at the German Primate Center and compared them to the
results of great apes. The data for the apes were kindly made
available to us by Hermann and colleagues.
If an increase in brain size predicts an overall increase in
cognitive performance, we would hypothesize that the monkeys
perform less well than the apes in all experiments. In contrast, if an
increase in brain size is (more or less) linearly related to an increase
in socio-cognitive skills, then we would predict that the apes
outcompete the monkeys especially in the socio-cognitive tasks,
while they should perform on a more or less comparable level in
the physical domain. However, it might also be the case that the
human lineage underwent a nonlinear increase in socio-cognitive
skills, in which case we would predict that apes and monkeys do
not reveal substantial differences in either of the cognitive
domains. As recent studies have shown further factors can
influence the performance in cognitive tasks such as a shy or bold
temperament [27,28] or the amount of inhibitory control [24,29].
To control for those aspects we included the temperament and
inhibitory control experiments of Herrmann et al. [18] in which
we measured the subject’s reaction to novel objects, people, and
rewards, and their ability to control their impulses in a spatial
memory task. In relation to the previous studies we expected to
find an influence of these parameters on the cognitive perfor-
mances of the monkeys.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
All testing was non-invasive and the subjects participated
voluntarily in the experiments. They were not food deprived for
testing and water was always available ad libitum. All experiments
were performed under the control of experienced veterinarians to
ensure that the studies were in accordance with the NRC Guide
for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals and the European
Directive 2010/63/EU on the protection of animals used for
scientific purposes. Furthermore, in accordance with the German
Animal Welfare Act and corresponding section for animals used
for scientific purposes, the study approval was checked by the
responsible Animal Welfare Officer of the German Primate
Center (Permit Number 33.9-42502).
Subjects
We tested 13 long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) - 6 males
and 7 females aged 1 to 7 years (Mage=2.8 years) - living in a
social group of 28 animals and 5 olive baboons (Papio anubis)- 3
males and 2 females aged 3 to 9 years (Mage=6.1 years) - living in
a social group of 11 animals. The monkeys were housed at the
German Primate Center in Go ¨ttingen and had access to indoor
(baboons: 17 sqm, macaques: 40 sqm) and outdoor areas
(baboons: 81 sqm, macaques: 141 sqm). The subjects were
individually tested in their familiar indoor cages. Before the
testing began all animals were trained to be separated from the
group using positive reinforcement. One session lasted about 10 to
15 minutes. If an animal was not willing to participate in a session
(e.g. not choosing a reward option) it was released again to the
group and tested on another day.
Primate Cognition Test Battery
As the aim of this study was to conduct a systematic interspecific
comparison, we used the same experimental procedures of the so-
called Primate Cognition Test Battery (PCTB) as Herrmann and
colleagues [18]. The PCTB consists of 16 tasks examining skills of
physical cognition, i.e. an understanding of objects and their
spatial, numeral and causal relationships, as well as of social
cognition, i.e. an understanding of other animate beings and their
intentional actions, perceptions, and knowledge. The 16 tasks are
grouped into six scales. Three of these scales belong to the physical
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tested the monkeys’ understanding of spatial displacements, their
quantity discrimination abilities, and their understanding of the
causal relations between two objects. The other three scales belong
to the social domain: Social learning, Communication, and
Theory of Mind. In these experiments we examined whether the
monkeys imitate simple tasks such as shaking a reward out of a
tube, understand communicative cues and intentional actions, as
well as whether they follow the gaze of a human.
In contrast to Herrmann et al. we applied control conditions to
some of the tasks and new quantity combinations in the quantity
discrimination experiments (see File S1 for a detailed description
of the methods). We adjusted the size of the material used to be
operable for the baboons and long-tailed macaques, respectively.
To facilitate the comparison of our results with those of Herrmann
and colleagues, we here applied the same terminology as in the
previous study. In the discussion, we will critically evaluate some of
the connotations associated with the terms used for these
experiments.
In the following we will shortly outline the experimental
procedure of the 16 tasks of the PCTB. Some tasks consist of
different items, which are described in detail in the Supporting
Information and Herrmann et al [18].
Physical Domain
Space. To test the monkeys’ ability to track specific objects
while they were being displaced in various ways, we conducted
different ‘spatial displacement’ tasks. In total this scale is made up
of four different tasks: Spatial Memory, Object Permanence, Rotation, and
Transposition. In each task, three cups were aligned in a row on the
testing tray and manipulated differently: To test their Spatial
Memory two rewards were placed under two of the three cups and
the subject was allowed to choose twice. In the Object Permanence
task a small opaque cup, which contained a reward, was moved
under one or two of the three larger cups in succession, leaving the
reward under one of these at the end. The subject had to track
these operations to locate the reward. We conducted an additional
control condition in which the experimenter also touched the cups
under which the smaller cup was not moved with her hand to
examine whether the subjects only chose the last cup touched by
the experimenter or really took into account where the smaller cup
was moved to. In the Rotation task three cups, one containing the
reward, were aligned on a moveable tray, which than was rotated
180u and 360u. The subjects had to follow the rotation to locate
the reward. In the Transposition task the position of the baited cup
was switched with the position of the other cups in three different
ways. The subjects had to follow these transpositions to locate the
reward.
Quantities. To test the monkeys’ abilities to discriminate
between different food amounts, we conducted different two-
choice experiments where they received the amount of food pieces
they had pointed at. This scale consisted of two tasks: Relative
Numbers and Addition Numbers. In the so-called Relative Numbers task
the monkeys could choose between 1 and 8 food pieces lying on
two different plates with differences between the two amounts
ranging from 1 to 4 pieces. In the so-called Addition Numbers task the
subjects were shown three different amounts of food items. The
food items from the center plate were transferred to one of the side
plates after a few seconds. The subjects had to choose the resulting
larger number to be scored as a correct response.
Causality. To test their understanding of the spatial-causal
relationships between two objects the monkeys were tested in four
different tasks: Noise, Shape, Tool Use, and Tool Properties. In the Noise
task, the subjects had to choose one of two cups. To give them a
hint where the reward was located the cups were shaken. One cup
contained a peanut and made a rattling sound when shaken. In the
Shape task either two plastic boards or two pieces of cloth were
placed on the tray. A reward was placed under one of the boards
or cloths causing a visible bump, and the subjects were allowed to
choose. To test their Tool Use abilities a reward was placed on the
tray out of reach of the subject and a wooden stick was provided to
the subject. The subject had to use the tool to retrieve the out of
reach food. In the Tool Properties task a functional and a non-
functional tool were presented. For example, a reward was placed
on top of one piece of cloth, whereas the other reward was placed
directly next to the other cloth piece. The subjects were allowed to
pull one of the two pieces. Altogether, five different items were
used in this task (cloth: food was placed on top or right next to a
piece of cloth; Plexiglas bridge: a small bridge was placed over a
piece of cloth; food was placed on top of the bridge or underneath
directly onto the cloth; ripped cloth: food was placed on an intact
or a ripped piece of cloth; broken wool: food was tied to the end of
an intact or cut string of wool; tray circle: food was placed into a
cardboard piece with a round hole in it or with a u-shaped
opening, an attached string allowed the monkeys to pull the tray).
Social Domain
Social Learning. To test whether the monkeys’ imitate
simple actions done by a human to get food three different
items were used. In all experiments a human demonstrator showed
the subjects how to open three different plastic tubes which
contained a reward (Paper tube, Banana tube, Stick tube). We scored
whether the subjects solved the problem by the same means as the
demonstrator. The behaviour of the subjects was compared to that
of a control group (3 baboons and 3 macaques) who were given the
opportunity to open the tubes without prior exposure to a human
demonstrator (baseline condition).
Communication. To test their ability to use communicative
cues by humans, the subjects were tested in three different tasks:
Comprehension, Pointing Cups, and Attentional State.
The Comprehension task consisted of a two-choice paradigm in
which the experimenter gave different cues to locate the reward.
She either looked or pointed at the cup, which contained the
reward or – in the control condition - placed an iconic marker (e.g.
picture of a peanut) on it. The animal was then allowed to make its
choice.
In the two tasks under the umbrella term Production two
experimenters were needed. In the Pointing Cups task, one
experimenter baited one of two cups, which were placed about
70 cm apart and left the room. Then the second experimenter
entered the room. We then scored whether the subject indicated
its choice by pointing at a cup. In the Attentional State task the
attentional state of the main experimenter varied in four different
ways. A second experimenter first placed a reward in front of the
subject’s cage and left the room. When the main experimenter
entered the testing area, she either turned around and looked away
from the reward, looked towards the reward, turned towards the
reward but looked away or turned away from the reward but
looked at it. The subject had to draw the experimenter’s attention
to the reward (e.g. by moving into her visual field and reaching for
the reward) in order to receive it.
Theory of Mind. The experiments under this umbrella term
encompassed experiments in two different tasks: Gaze Following and
Intentions. In the Gaze Following task the experimenter sat in front of
the monkey, hid a piece of food in her hands, and then completed
three different actions: She held her hands in front of her body and
looked up with her head and eyes; she sat with her back facing the
subject, holding her hands next to her shoulders and looked up to
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with her eyes only up to the ceiling. A response was scored if the
subject followed the gaze of the experimenter and looked up. The
behaviour of the subjects was compared to a baseline condition in
which we measured how often the monkeys gazed upwards when
the experimenter looked straight at the subject’s chest (we did not
stare directly at their eyes as this is a threatening behaviour in
monkeys).
In the Intentions task, the experimenter tried to retrieve a reward
out of one of two cups but failed. In the first test, she tried in vain
to remove a lid; in the second test, a Plexiglas barrier blocked her
access to the cup. The subject was then allowed to choose one of
the cups.
Testing Apparatus and General Procedure
To test the cognitive capacities of the animals, they were
separated from their group in their familiar indoor compartments.
The testing apparatus used in most of the experiments (when other
material was used it is indicated in the description of the
experiments in the Supporting Information) consisted of a sliding
board made of grey polyvinylchloride (length 0.8 m, width
0.27 m, height 0.01 m (baboons); length 0.55 m, width 0.2 m,
height 0.01 m (macaques)), which was attached to a fixed
polyvinylchloride table (length 0.8 m, width 0.38 m, height
0.01 m (baboons); length 0.55 m, width 0.3 m, height 0.01 m
(macaques)) by two drawer rails so that the sliding table could be
moved horizontally. Three white opaque cups (Ø 7.5 cm67.5 cm
height) or other materials (which are reported in File S1) were used
to cover/present the food reward. These were placed on the
sliding table. The sliding table was attached with an iron mount in
front of a plastic panel. The middle of the plastic panel was cut
out, which allowed one of two different kinds of plastic slices to be
inserted, depending on the tasks performed. One of the plastic
slices had three holes in it (Ø 1 cm, distance 20 cm (baboons),
distance 15 cm (macaques)) that allowed the subjects to point with
their fingers at the cups. The other slice had two oval openings at
the outer sites (5.5 cm62.5, distance 25 cm (baboons),
5.5 cm61.5 cm, distance 30 cm (macaques)) to allow the subjects
to retrieve e.g. pieces of cloth. Depending on the tasks, one of the
two slices was attached to the panel.
Throughout testing, unless otherwise indicated, a choice was
scored when the subjects pointed with one finger at one of the
locations or put their fingers through one of the oval openings to
retrieve e.g. cloth after the sliding table had been pushed against
the Plexiglas panel. When the monkeys indicated the correct
location, they were given a small food reward. However, unless
otherwise stated, when they made incorrect responses they were
always shown the location of the hidden food after each trial. The
same desirable food items were used as rewards for most of the
tasks (raisins, peanuts, pieces of fruits). It was possible to set up an
occluder of grey plastic (length 0.8 m, height 0.3 cm, thickness
0.03 m) in front of the panel so that the subjects were not able to
watch the baiting procedures. All sessions were videotaped with a
digital video camera (Sony DCR-HC90E). A naı ¨ve second
observer coded 20% of all videotapes to assess inter-observer
reliability, which was excellent (Cohen’s K=.97, N=809).
Design
In general, we followed the design of Herrmann et al. [18] but
doubled the number of trials in the object-choice tasks (see File S1)
in order to include all possible spatial positions and combination of
locations to control for the influence of using only a subset of all
possible manipulations (see description of the specific tasks for
details). Furthermore, we wanted to reduce the risk of obtaining
significant effects by chance due to our smaller sample size in
combination with a very small number of trials. We also controlled
for learning over the trials, but did not find any effects in any of the
tasks (Pearson Correlations between Trial and Performance; note
however that only a small number of trials were conducted per
condition and individual). For the other tasks, i.e. those that did
not include object choice (Social learning, Attentional State and
Gaze following), we applied the same number of trials as in the
study by Herrmann and colleagues (2007) since in these
experiments, the subjects had to perform specific actions, which
probably did not happen coincidentally (see also control
experiments for Social learning and Gaze following).
Furthermore, we pseudo-randomized and balanced the order of
administering the experiments of the different scales across
individuals to exclude any order effect. Eight of the individuals
started with the experiments of the physical domain (5 baboons
and 3 macaques) and ten started with the tasks of the social
domain. There was no difference in the performance of the
monkeys in relation to whether they started with the social or
physical domain (ANOVA with first domain as between subject
factor and performance in the two domains as dependent
variables, F (2, 15)=0.28 p=.757, g
2=.036). Within each scale
and task, the order of the experiments was also pseudo-
randomized and balanced across individuals.
All macaques were completely naive to cognitive testing and
working with a human experimenter prior to these experiments.
The baboons had already participated in an experiment on size
discrimination (manuscript in preparation) and a study about
inferential reasoning [30].
Influence of Temperament, Inhibitory Control and Rank
on Performance
To test whether differing temperaments, inhibitory control or
rank positions influenced the monkeys’ performances in the test
battery, each subject participated in a set of additional tests
comparable to those used by Herrmann et al. [18] (see File S2 for
detailed descriptions). In terms of temperament we measured the
subjects approaching behaviour to novel objects, people and foods.
Their amount of inhibitory control was examined during an
additional spatial memory task, which specifically assessed whether
the monkeys are able to skip the middle out of three cups. To
assess the influence of rank we classified each individual as high,
middle or low ranking on the basis of focal observations done by
V.S..We then tested whether the results of these measurements
correlated with the performance of the monkeys in the PCTB
(Pearson correlations).
Data analysis
First, we determined the overall proportion of correct responses
in each task for every subject. To measure whether the baboons
and macaques performed above chance level or baseline we used
the Wilcoxon-test because of the small sample sizes (to correct for
multiple testing we applied a Benjamini-Hochberg correction). On
the individual level we used Binomial-tests to see whether the
performance was significantly better than expected by chance. To
explore whether there were significant differences between the
performances of the baboons and macaques in the test battery we
conducted multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with
species and sex or rank as between-subject factor and performance
of the baboons and macaques in each task as dependent variable.
In case of significant effects we controlled for age by using analysis
of covariance (ANCOVA). To further compare the performance
of the baboons and macaques in each task we used univariate
analysis of Variance (ANOVA) or in cases when data were not
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Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA. In case of significant effects, post-hoc
tests (Bonferroni) were conducted. For the tool use task no
statistical analyses were possible as performance was zero for all
subjects. As we did not have information about the performance of
the apes in each task, we only conducted repeated measures
ANOVAs on the scale level, with follow-up post-hoc tests
(Bonferroni) to compare the performance of the four species
(baboon, macaque, chimpanzee, orangutan). The critical p-value
was set to a=.05 (except for pair wise comparisons) and all tests
were two-tailed.
Results
Performance in the different Tasks
Space. On the species level both baboons and macaques
performed significantly above chance level (0.33) in all four tasks of
the scale Space (see Figure 1) (macaques: Spatial Memory (z=3.04,
adjusted p=.012), Object Permanence (z=3.18, adjusted p=.022),
Rotation (z=3.18 adjusted p=.015); and Transposition (z=2.76,
adjusted p=.016); baboons: Spatial Memory, Object Permanence,
Rotation and Transposition (all zs=2.02, all adjusted ps=.049)).
The macaques also performed above chance level in the control task
we conducted during the Object Permanence tests (z=2.93,
adjusted p=.012), and the performance of the baboons also nearly
reached significance (z=1.83, adjusted p=.075). On the individual
level,however,noneofthemacaquesperformedabovechanceinthe
transposition task, whereas four out of five baboons did (see Table1).
Quantity. Both species performed significantly above chance
level (0.5) in the two tasks on quantity discrimination (see Figure 1)
(macaques: Relative Numbers (z=3.06, adjusted p=.013), Addition
Numbers (z=2.80, adjusted p=.017);baboons:RelativeNumbers
(z=2.02, adjusted p=.049), Addition Numbers (z=2.02, adjusted
p=.049)). On the individual level none of the baboons, but two
macaquesperformedabovechanceintheAdditionNumbertask(see
Table 1).
Causality. None of the baboons or macaques solved the tool
use task where they had to use a stick to retrieve food. However, on
the species level the macaques performed above chance (0.5) in two
other tasks of the scale Causality: Shape (z=2.67, adjusted p=.019),
and Tool properties (z=3.18, adjusted p=.044) and nearly reached
significant values in the task Noise (z=2.20, adjusted p=.055) (see
Figure 1). The baboons however only performed significantly above
chance in the Shape condition (z=2.02, adjusted p=.049).
Figure 1. Performance of the monkeys in the PCTB. Shown are the proportions of correct responses of the baboons (white) and macaques
(grey) in the 16 tasks of the PCTB grouped into the respective scale. Boxes show the interquartile range from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile. The line
across the boxes represents the median. The whiskers indicate the maximum and minimum values excluding outliers (circles) and extreme values
(crosses). The dotted lines represent the chance level and baseline, respectively for each task.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032024.g001
Monkeys Compare to Apes in the PCTB
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 April 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 4 | e32024Social learning. In the baseline condition, where the subjects
did not get any demonstration on how to open the different tubes,
none of the six subjects used a method similar to the one
demonstrated in the test condition. In this condition, neither the
baboons nor the macaques showed any evidence of social learning.
Only once did one baboon use a similar technique as the human
demonstrator, but that does not deviate significantly from the
baseline (0.0) (see Figure 1).
Communication. The macaques performed significantly
above chance level in all three tasks of the scale Communication,
i.e. Comprehension (chance 0.5, z=2.83, adjusted p=.014),
Pointing Cups (chance 0.5, z=2.93, adjusted p=.012), and
Attentional State (chance 0, z=2.37, adjusted p=.038). The
baboons performed significantly above chance only in the
Comprehension (z=2.02, adjusted p=.049) and Pointing Cups
tasks (z=2.02, adjusted p=.049), but not in the Attentional State
condition (z=1.60, adjusted p=.113) (see Figure 1). However, none
of the baboons performed above chance in the Gaze and Point
condition of the Comprehension task, but three macaques did
(Binomial-tests, p=.016). In contrast, none of the macaques
performed significantly above chance in the Attentional state task
(see Table 1), whereas two of the baboons scored a 100% correct.
Theory of Mind. Considering gaze following both baboons
and macaques performed significantly above baseline, which we
assessed by the monkeys’ looks upwards while the experimenter was
looking straight (theylookedupwards inM=10 percent of all trials).
In the test situation the macaques followed the human gaze very
often(M=.57,z=3.18,adjustedp=.011),whereasthebaboonsdid
so a bit less (M=.33, z=2.02, adjusted p=.049) (see Figure 1). Both
species also performed significantly above chance level (0.5) in the
task on understanding intentions (macaques: z=2.52, adjusted
p=.027; baboons: z=2.02, adjusted p=.049). On the individual
level 12 macaques and three baboons followed the human gaze
significantly moreoften than in the baseline condition, whereas only
two out of 13 macaques performed above chance in the Intention
task, but three out of five baboons did (see Table 1).
Comparison of Baboons and Macaques
As none of the baboons or macaques solved the tool use task,
we had to exclude it from the following statistical analysis of
variance. Considering the performance in the other 15 tasks of
the PCTB a multivariate analysis of variance revealed no
significant differences between the two species (MANOVA with
species and sex as between-subject factor and performance in the
15 different tasks as dependent variables; Wilk’s Lambda, F
(11,1)=4.88, p=.346,g
2=.982). However, as Figure 1 indicates,
there was a large difference between the species in the
transposition task, and univariate analyses indeed revealed that
here the baboons performed significantly better than the
macaques (Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA, H (1, N=18)=8.10,
p=.004) also when age was controlled for (F (1, 15)=119.61,
p,.001, g
2=.889). There were no significant differences between
the species in any other tasks after correction for multiple testing
(all ps..01).
Table 1. Mean proportion of correct responses of the baboons and macaques in each task (and Scale) of the PCTB.
macaques baboons
Tasks Trials n M (SD) 95% CI Ind n M (SD) 95% CI Ind Chance
Space .54 (.06) [.51,.58] .69 (.03) [.65, .73]
Spatial Mem 6 13 .68 (.22) [.55, .81] 7 5 .83 (.12) [.69, .98] 4 .33
Object Perm 18 13 .65 (.08) [.60, .70] 13 5 .71 (.06) [.64, .79] 5 .33
Rotation 18 13 .46 (.09) [.41, .51] 5 5 .49 (.19) [.25, .73] 1 .33
Transposition 18 13 .39 (.07) [.35, .44] 0 5 .73 (.17) [.52, .95] 4 .33
Quantity .67 (.08) [.62, .72] .66 (.06) [.59, .73]
Rel Numbers 16 13 .70 (.13) [.62, .78] 4 5 .69 (.15) [.51, .87] 1 .50
Add Numbers 14 12 .64 (.11) [.57, .71] 2 5 .63 (.03) [.59, .67] 0 .50
Causality .46 (.05) [.43, .50] .46 (.04) [.41, .51]
Noise 12 13 .56 (.07) [.51, .60] 0 5 .50 (.08) [.40, .60] 0 .50
Shape 12 13 .66 (.17) [.56, .76] 2 5 .70 (.13) [.54, .86] 2 .50
Tool Use 1 13 0 0 5 0 0 .00
Tool Prop 30 13 .64 (.08) [.59, .68] 4 5 .63 (.12) [.48, .77] 2 .50
Social learning 31 0 0 0 5 .07 (.15) [2.12, .25] 0 .00
a
Communication .53 (.13) [.45, .61] .69 (.21) [.42, .95]
Comprehension 18 13 .66 (.17) [.56, .76] 4 5 .71(.09) [.60, .82] 4 .50
Pointing Cups 8 13 .69 (.15) [.60, .78] 3 5 .90 (.16) [.70, 1.10] 4 .50
Attention State 4 13 .23 (.26) [.07, .39] 0 5 .45 (.51) [2.19, 1.09] 2 .00
Theory of Mind .59 (.10) [.53, .65] .57 (.13) [.41, .74]
Gaze following 9 13 .57 (.17) [.47, .67] 12 5 .33 (.21) [.08, .60] 3 .10
a
Intention 12 13 .62 (.14) [.53, .70] 2 5 .82 (.11) [.68, .95] 3 .50
Note: Significant deviations from chance level are in boldface (a=.05). Performance on the scale level was not compared to chance as this varies between tasks.
Trials=Number of trials performed in each task; n=Number of tested individuals; Ind=Number of individuals performing above chance level; CI=confidence interval;
aresults of the baseline conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032024.t001
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We found no significant correlations between the temperament
measures and the performance of the monkeys in the two domains
for either macaques (social domain (r (12)=2.27, p=.395),
physical domain (r (12)=.18, p=.576); nor baboons (social
domain (r (5)=.66, p=.229), physical domain (r (5)=.58,
p=.299). Furthermore, there were no significant correlations
between the performance in the social and physical domain and
the inhibitory control task for the macaques (social domain:
Spearman correlations (13)=2.18, p=.565; physical domain:
Spearman correlations (13)=.04, p=.892) and baboons (social
domain: Spearman correlations (5)=.58, p=.308; physical
domain: Spearman correlations (5)=.00, p=1). Rank and sex
had also no effect on the performance of the monkeys in the PCTB
(rank: F (18, 2)=1.84, p=.409, g
2=.943; sex: F (11, 1)=2.15,
p=.491, g
2=.959).
Comparison of Monkeys and Apes
To compare the performances of the four species (baboons,
macaques, chimpanzees, orangutans) we calculated the mean
proportion of correct responses in each scale for the two monkey
species and compared this to the results for the chimpanzees and
orangutans taken from Herrmann et al. [18] (Figure 2). Statistical
analysis revealed a significant effect of species (repeated measures
ANOVA; Wilk’ Lambda, F (18, 407.78)=6.09, p,.001,
g
2=.211). Post-hoc test (Bonferroni), however, showed that there
were no significant differences between monkeys and apes in the
scales Quantity, Social learning and Communication (all ps..266).
The chimpanzees performed significantly better than the ma-
caques only in the scales Space and Causality (Post-hoc tests, space
p,.001, causality p,.001) and better than the baboons only in the
scale Causality (Post-hoc test, p=.005). However, the differences
in the scale Causality were mainly due to the ‘tool use’ task, which
none of the monkeys solved. Looking at the scale Causality
without including the tool use task there were no significant
differences between the species (Posthoc tests, p=1). In the scale
Theory of Mind the macaques performed significantly better than
the chimpanzees (p,.001) and orangutans (p,.001), and the
baboons performed significantly better than the orangutans
(p=.002). There were no significant differences between the
baboons and chimpanzees after correction for multiple testing in
this scale.
Discussion
The results of our experiments indicate that olive baboons and
long-tailed macaques have a very good understanding of objects
and their spatial, numeral, and causal relations. Both monkey
species performed above chance in all tasks on spatial displace-
ments and quantity discrimination and showed only some
limitations in experiments on causal understanding (e.g. tool
use). An analysis of the performance in the social domain reveals a
more inconsistent picture. Although the monkeys followed the
gaze of the human experimenter significantly more often than in
the baseline condition, they only marginally used the gazing cue in
Figure 2. Comparison of species. Shown are the proportions of correct responses on the scale level for the four different primate species. Boxes
show the interquartile range from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile. The line across the boxes represents the median. The whiskers indicate the
maximum and minimum values excluding outliers (circles) and extreme values (crosses).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032024.g002
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not show any indication of imitation in the social learning tests and
only two baboons seemed to show some understanding of the
attentional state of the experimenter. In contrast the monkeys
performed very well when intentional actions of the experimenter
served as a cue in an object choice task. However, as this can also
be explained by simply using local enhancement, this result should
be interpreted with caution (see below).
The good performances of our monkeys in the physical domain
are in line with a recent comparative study on New and Old
World monkeys, which found no clear-cut distinction between the
capacities of monkeys and apes [23]. Comparing the performance
of our monkeys to that of great apes in the physical tasks of the
PCTB also revealed no distinct differences between the two taxa
(i.e. Hominoidea and Cercopithecoidea). However, we found
cognitive differences between particular species, especially in tasks
on spatial transpositions. The olive baboons in our experiments
outperformed all three monkey species (spider monkeys, capuchin
monkeys, long-tailed macaques) tested by Amici and colleagues
[23], mirroring our finding that the baboons performed signifi-
cantly better than the macaques in the Transposition task. This is
particularly interesting as mastering these fairly demanding object
displacement tasks has not yet been reliably shown in Old World
monkeys and the ability has long been used as the main type of
data to support the distinction between apes and monkeys [22].
We, however, found no significant differences between the
performances of baboons and great apes in these tasks.
Interestingly Herrmann et al. [18] also found significant
differences in the scale Space between chimpanzees and
orangutans. Thus, although there are differences between species
in this aspect, there seems to be no deep split between apes and
monkeys. Recently, differences in cognitive capacity have been
linked to social organisation. Specifically, it was suggested that
subjects living in fission-fusion societies may exhibit enhanced
cognitive skills [23,24]. Constant fission and fusion among
subgroups is thought to require enhanced memory, inhibitory
control and analogical reasoning as subjects are permanently
confronted with changing group compositions [31]. For our two
species, however, this explanation does not apply as both olive
baboons and long-tailed macaques live in stable female-bonded
groups. Why certain species do better than others in spatial tasks
may also have something to do with the foraging techniques used,
but this issue requires further empirical investigation.
Furthermore, we found no differences between monkeys and
apes in the quantity discrimination tasks, and the differences in the
scale Causality were mainly due to the monkeys failing to use a
stick to retrieve out-of-reach food. In contrast to the finding by
Amici and colleagues [23], however, our long-tailed macaques
performed reasonably well in the tasks on tool properties. Indeed,
long-tailed macaques have been reported to use tools in the wild,
supporting the assumption that they should have some under-
standing of the causal relations between an object and food. For
instance, they use stones to crack open oysters or crabs and do so
quite efficiently [32,33]. That they failed in the Tool Use task of
the PCTB may therefore be due to the high difficulty of this task as
it requires quite fine scaled motor control and may have had too
little ecological relevance for the monkeys. These results further
support the view that the physico-cognitive capacities of monkeys
and apes are not that distinct in general, but that differences
between species exist in more specific aspects, which may be better
explained by socio-ecological aspects than by phylogenetic
relationships [23].
Concerning the tasks of the social domain, we also did not find
an increase in performance from monkeys to apes. The long-tailed
macaques even scored significantly higher than the apes in the
Theory of Mind scale. However, despite the fact that the monkeys
did well in the Theory of Mind tasks, it should be noted that most
of the tasks can be solved without attribution of mental states. For
instance, gaze following can be conceived as a simple orienting
reflex or somewhat more elaborate as behaviour reading (for a
study on gaze following see e.g. [34]). Thus, the extensive gaze-
following behaviour of the macaques does not imply an enhanced
understanding of other minds, especially in comparison to the
baboons and apes. The macaques seemed to be more re-active
and tuned to the experimenter during the gaze following
experiments, probably leading to a slowed habituation.
The Pointing Cups and Intention tasks also consisted of two-
choice tests, which could have been solved by just behaviour
reading or by using spatial associations as e.g. the proximity
between the experimenter’s hand and the cup (for a discussion on
behaviour reading see e.g. [35,36]). Furthermore, the baboons had
already participated in two-choice experiments before and it may
well be that their former experience with human subjects in this
kind of setup improved their performance. To summarize, we do
not imply that our subjects attribute mental states to others, and
only chose this terminology to remain consistent with previous
studies [18].
Taken together, our experiments neither showed an increase in
general intelligence nor in socio-cognitive abilities from Old World
monkeys to apes, contradicting the theory that an increase in brain
size is necessarily linked to an increase in intelligence [22]. In
contrast, the species differences we found were on a more domain
specific level (e.g. spatial displacements) with variation between but
also within taxa. These findings may be somewhat surprising as a
number of studies claimed that there is a large difference between
apes and monkeys, in particular in their ability to form mental
representations [37], i.e. to hold in mind and operate on mental
objects that have semantic properties [38]. Whereas the cognitive
system of great apes was interpreted as qualitatively more human-
like with some understanding of others’ mental states, desires, and
intentions [39–41], the cognitive abilities shown by monkeys were
mainly attributed to rapid learning capacities [37,42]. However, a
recent study suggests that not only apes but also monkeys are able
to form mental representations [29]. We tested the same olive
baboons and long-tailed macaques in a quantity discrimination
task with food and non-food items and found that the performance
of the monkeys was influenced by their representation of the items
as reward or choice stimuli and not by their quality (being edible
or not).
Yet, we do not claim that the cognitive abilities of monkeys and
apes are generally similar, either. It could also be the case that only
the cognitive competencies in the items that were tested in the
PCTB do not differ substantially. The PCTB mainly consists of
experiments from developmental psychology that were designed to
unravel the ontogeny of human specific skills (Social learning,
Communication, Theory of Mind). Thus, it is possible that the
tasks have been too difficult to allow a measurable difference
between monkeys and apes. On the other hand, the good
performance in the physical domain may constitute a ceiling effect.
In other words, these tasks were structurally simpler and thus
yielded high scores in many of the tasks. Furthermore, although
the monkeys were able to solve most of the tasks in the physical
domain, it is not clear whether they really had an understanding of
the underlying physical properties. So it may well be that one
would find differences between species when analyzing more
specifically how the subjects solved the different tasks [43].
Another issue that needs to be evaluated critically is the fact that
in the original study [18], two to three year old children were
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would be highly desirable to assess the performance of adult
humans in these tasks to obtain a more comprehensive picture.
Moreover, in contrast to non-human primates, children are tested
by members of their own species (for a critical review see e.g [44]).
Thus, such species comparisons often cannot control for a number
of serious confounds, which should be held in mind.
Despite these limitations, the idea to test different species in such
a large battery of tasks is a productive approach in comparative
cognition studies. There is a caveat, however. As Tinbergen [45]
already pointed out, the same test for a different species may not
be the same test. Above all, this applies to situations where a given
test yields different results (as in the case of the children vs. the
nonhuman primates). In such instances, it is necessary to further
investigate why a given species apparently fails in a certain test,
and to develop experiments with a high ecological validity for each
species. For instance, baboons and macaques hardly ever use sticks
to retrieve food, so it is perhaps not surprising that they failed in
this task.
A recent paper on comparative phylogenetic methods strongly
encourages the integration of comparative psychology and
evolutionary biology [19]. It is particularly important to consider
variation in the species’ socio-ecology in such analyses. Further-
more, future studies should also take care of variations in
physiological characteristics between species, as e.g. in visual
fields or attention patterns. Differences between species may be
influenced by perceptual rather than cognitive differences. In
addition, it would be highly desirable to compare the abilities of
the same species in different labs and settings, to obtain a
comprehensive understanding of the variability between and
within species. Although we did not find any significant
correlations between the temperament and inhibition control
measures respectively and the cognitive performance of the
monkeys in our study, taking such additional factors into account
has proven to be useful when comparing the cognitive abilities of
different species [18,24].
In conclusion, our study provides the first evidence that the
cognitive skills of monkeys and apes are much more similar than
expected both in the social and physical domain, at least in the
tests of the PCTB. Hence, our results support the view of an
accelerated evolution of social respectively cultural intelligence in
humans [18]. We could furthermore show that it is essential to use
a wide range of experiments when comparing the cognitive
capacities of different species. Using only a subset of experiments
(e.g. only spatial displacements) would have led to completely
different conclusions. Thus, future comparative approaches should
also consider including multiple cognitive experiments of different
domains.
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